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HIPAA-Phobia Hampers Efforts To Track And Contain COVID-19 
 




Passed in 1996, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA)1 sets privacy standards for healthcare providers, hospitals, and 
their business associates.  No doubt well-intentioned, HIPAA has come to 
embody a force beyond its original purpose.  It has become a boogeyman 
for those entrusted with health information, even when HIPAA does not 
actually apply to them.  Doctors, information technology specialists, and 
schools officials walk on eggshells to avoid violating federal privacy law.  
In the current pandemic, this fear of violating HIPAA has created 
inefficiencies in addressing COVID-19.  This essay looks at a few ways that 
HIPAA-phobia is hampering the flow of information that could help public 
health teams combat this illness.  Finally, the essay explores regulatory and 
legislative ways to address HIPAA anxiety and its negative consequences.  
 
I.  Fear Of HIPAA Can Muzzle Doctors’ Ability To Warn The Public Early 
On 
 
Medical training ingrains in healthcare providers that patient privacy is 
sacrosanct.  So much so, that medical providers will err on the side of the 
caution when faced with a grey decision to disclose—even if it may benefit 
public health.  During the early days of the pandemic, in March 2020, the 
following exchange between a doctor and a reporter exemplifies what could 
have been opportunity spread awareness of where and when the virus may 
have been transmitted: 
 
Reporter Ike Bendavid: Can we learn more about this patient? I mean, were 
they active in the community? Where did they travel? There are a lot of 




* Resident Physician, Department of Psychiatry, Oregon Health & Science University 
1 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 
(1996). 
 




Dr. Steve Leffler: I want to remind people we are bound by federal law and 
what we can tell you.2 
 
This exchange highlights the instinctive fear that healthcare workers have 
when revealing information about patients.   
 
At that early stage (this was the second patient in the state), members of the 
public could have used the information to self-quarantine and pursue 
testing.  But Dr. Leffler was reluctant to share information about who might 
have been exposed, citing “federal law” (implicitly HIPAA).  Contact 
tracing is labor intensive, imperfect, and relies on government efficiency.  
Publicly notifying potential contacts where and when they may have been 
exposed would add another layer of notice to those efforts. 
 
Of note, there are exceptions already built into HIPAA that could justify 
release of a COVID-19 patient’s recent whereabouts and activities.  One 
such exception involves public health and the need to identify those who 
were exposed.3  Another exception allows disclosure of information when 
“necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health 
or safety of a person or the public”4  In this scenario, the doctor could have 
justified saying more about the patient—one of the first in the state—based 
on either of these exceptions.  But with the specter of HIPAA lurking, he 
chose not to. 
 
The American approach contrasts with that in Israel, where the government 
made public where coronavirus cases had been.  In one instance in late 
February 2020, the Israeli government made public the flight he had taken, 
the toy store he had visited, and even the approximate times he was at the 
store.5  This stands in contrast to Dr. Leffler’s inability to provide this basic 
information to the public due to “federal law.”   
 
 
2 Ike Bendavid, Vt. patient with 2nd COVID-19 case in critical condition, WCAX.COM (Mar. 
12, 2020), https://www.wcax.com/content/news/UVM-to-provide-details-on-2nd-COVID-
19-case-NH-reports-6th-case-568739241.html. 
3 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(iv) (2016). 
4 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j)(1)(i)(A) (2016). 
5 Health Ministry: Israeli with coronavirus visited toy store before diagnosis, TIMES OF ISRAEL 
(Feb. 27, 2020).  https://www.timesofisrael.com/health-ministry-israeli-with-coronavirus-
visited-toy-store-before-diagnosis/. 
 




II.  HIPAA-Encouraged Reliance On The Fax Machine Slows Down 
Contact-Tracing 
 
HIPAA has rigorous information security requirements (and 
correspondingly rigorous penalties) for “electronic” data, which 
disincentivize the use of electronic communications.  However, these rules 
(Subchapter C of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations) specifically 
carve out an exception for “transmissions, including of paper, via facsimile, 
and of voice, via telephone.”6  This is one of the reasons fax machines were 
estimated to account for 75% of medical communications.7 
 
Reliance on the fax machine as a HIPAA compliant mode of communication 
can hamper efforts to trace COVID-19 contacts.  In Hawaii, local media 
reported that “the state’s contact tracing program has relied on two fax 
machines to receive the thousands of new positive and suspected case 
reports pouring into its offices.”8  The same article noted that after faxes 
received, they were then being scanned for a period of time because staff 
were not aware that digital copies were automatically made.   
 
Similarly, the fax machine has hindered efforts in Texas, where using “faxes 
to report coronavirus cases in the state is a way to ensure a person's privacy is 
protected.”  Austin’s director of public health is quoted “we have a whole 
team of people who have to sort through more than a thousand faxes a 
day,” which he described as a “very manual and archaic process.”9  One 
could imagine a better system—computerized—where the team sorting 
through stacks of faxes could instead be focused on substantive work like 
contact tracing.   
 
 
6 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014). 
7 Brad Spannbauer, Does the Fax Machine Still Have A Place in Modern Healthcare?, HIT 
CONSULTANT (Aug. 27, 2018), https://hitconsultant.net/2018/08/27/fax-machines-modern-
healthcare/.   
8  Marcel Honore, How Hawaii’s Reliance On ‘Labor Intensive’ Fax Machines Hampers Contact 
Tracing, HONOLULU CIVIL BEAT (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.civilbeat.org/2020/09/how-
labor-intensive-fax-machines-hamper-hawaiis-contact-tracing/. 
9 Erik Ortiz, Amid coronavirus surge, Texas has a contact tracing problem: reporting cases by 
fax, NBC NEWS (June 26, 2020) (emphasis added), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/amid-coronavirus-surge-texas-has-contact-tracing-problem-reporting-cases-
n1232212.   
 




To be fair, HIPAA is not the only reason healthcare depends on the 
venerable fax.  Much has been said about the role of economic incentives 
for healthcare networks and hospitals to create barriers to leaving a given 
network.10  But HIPAA’s rigorous information security requirements and 
potential penalties only reinforce the economic incentive to use the fax.  For 
example, the University of Rochester settled a HIPAA violation stemming 
from loss of an unencrypted flash drive and theft of a laptop for USD 
$3,000,000.11   
 
American dependence on the fax machine contrasts with the high-tech 
approaches seen in East Asian countries during the start of the pandemic.  
There, digital contact tracing met with early success.12  But American 
healthcare IT, held back in part by HIPAA and its fines, is not there.   
 
III.  HIPAA-Phobia Limits Current Efforts To Monitor COVID-19 Spread 
 
In addition to limiting healthcare providers’ ability to share data—a context 
in which HIPAA actually applies—the reputational penumbra of that law 
has become so large that it has chilled data sharing outside healthcare.  Even 
those not covered by HIPAA, like schools, worry about violating it.  The text 
of the HIPAA rules make clear that it only applies to healthcare providers, 
organizations, and their business associates.13  Nonetheless, an everyday 
appreciation for HIPAA’s (justifiable) privacy protections has snowballed 
into a McCarthy-esque situation where officials hold onto information with 
white knuckles, lest they be accused of violating HIPAA.   
 
 
10 Alyssa Rege, Why the US health system still prioritizes fax machines: 7 things to know, 
BECKER’S HEALTH IT (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-
information-technology/why-the-us-health-system-still-prioritizes-fax-machines-7-
things-to-know.html. 
11 Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Failure to Encrypt Mobile Devices 
Leads to $3 Million HIPAA Settlement (Nov. 5, 2019), available at 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2019/11/05/failure-to-encrypt-mobile-devices-leads-to-
3-million-dollar-hipaa-settlement.html. 
12 Yasheng Huang et al., How Digital Contact Tracing Slowed Covid-19 in East Asia, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/04/how-digital-contact-tracing-slowed-
covid-19-in-east-asia. 
13 45 C.F.R. § 164.500 (2013). 
 




Some school administrators have been unwilling to discuss COVID-19 
cases due to fear of even potentially violating HIPAA.  When a staff 
member tested positive at one elementary school, the superintendent 
invoked HIPAA to avoid releasing details: “[d]ue to HIPAA privacy laws, 
the identity of the . . . staff member was not disclosed. The staff member’s 
position in the school was also not disclosed in connection with HIPAA 
privacy laws.”14 
 
In the case of the University of Alabama, which had over 1,000 cases during 
one week across three campuses, guidance was issued to faculty in the 
English Department that the pandemic makes “ANY reference to student 
health a potential HIPAA violation.”15  Someone who was exposed in a 
classroom might want to know about an infected colleague, but the 
misunderstanding of HIPAA would limit that. 
 
Perhaps more egregiously, lawyers and government officials are not 
immune from misunderstanding that HIPAA does not reach beyond 
healthcare.  The Attorney General of Louisiana—that state’s top legal 
official—recently cited HIPAA when declaring his opposition to the state 
health department’s release of school-specific coronavirus data. In response 
to this release, which was ordered by Louisiana’s Governor, John Bel 
Edwards, Attorney General Landry wrote on Twitter: “[S]chools report 
specific healthcare information on your child without your consent! I 
believe that this order may be in violation of HIPAA.”16 
 
And during the recent White House coronavirus outbreak, former press 
secretary Sean Spicer accused a news agency (via Twitter) of violating 
HIPAA by reporting about a current staffer’s positive test result.  Though 
 
14 Linda Murphy, Fall River schools report first COVID-19 case, HERALD NEWS (Sept. 21, 
2020), https://www.heraldnews.com/news/20200921/fall-river-schools-report-first-covid-
19-case. 
15  Meryl Kornfield, Universities can’t use privacy laws to withhold data on coronavirus 
outbreaks, experts say, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/09/02/college-coronavirus-privacy-
laws/. 
16 JC Canicosa, Attorney General Jeff Landry is challenging Louisiana public schools and health 








the claim is baseless (as noted by one of the law’s authors),17 a public 
accusation of violating federal law is enough to create a deterrent to 
information sharing, especially given the power of social media to 
disseminate incorrect information. 
 
Less data and less transparency make it more difficult for both 
policymakers and members of the public to make decisions that affect 
community spread of the pandemic.  Should kids (generally or specifically) 
go to in-person classes at school?  Should I go to work if there is a known 
cluster nearby?  Knowing how the virus has spread locally would be helpful 
to make that call at both the collective and individual levels.  But fear of 
HIPAA makes those with key data unwilling to share. 
 
IV.  Short And Long Term Solutions To HIPAA’s Chilling Effect On The 
Coronavirus Fight 
 
Addressing HIPAA-phobia can be done in the short term with executive 
action, and longer term with statutory reforms by Congress. 
 
Discretionary Enforcement To Promote Data Sharing 
 
Short-term, the executive branch can calm fears over information sharing 
and technology use by announcing discretionary non-enforcement during 
the emergency period.  One success story comes from the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), which announced discretionary non-
enforcement of HIPAA’s data safeguard standards to promote telehealth.  
Specifically, HHS announced that it would not seek penalties under HIPAA 
if providers used an application whose information security may not meet 
HIPAA standards.18  
 
 
17 Zack Budryk, Shalala corrects Spicer on HIPAA: 'I should know, I wrote it', MSN.COM (Oct. 
5, 2020), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/shalala-corrects-spicer-on-hipaa-i-
should-know-i-wrote-it/ar-BB19JmkT. 
18 OCR Issues Guidance on Telehealth Remote Communications Following Its Notification of 








Per HHS’s loosening of rules, “covered health care providers may use 
popular applications that allow for video chats, including Apple FaceTime, 
Facebook Messenger video chat, Google Hangouts video, Zoom, or Skype, 
to provide telehealth without risk that OCR [the HHS Office of Civil Rights] 
might seek to impose a penalty for noncompliance with the HIPAA 
Rules.”19   
 
Stories about so-called “Zoom bombing” point out that these everyday 
voice and videoconferencing applications do not boast ironclad 
information security,20 which would make them normally unacceptable 
under HIPAA.  Thanks in part to this change, telehealth went from 0.1% of 
Medicare primary care visits in February 2020 to 43.5% by April 2020.21  By 
easing fears of HIPAA (and multi-million dollar fines), the federal 
government was able to encourage routine healthcare needs to be met 
digitally, cutting away some of the bureaucracy that has kept the fax 
machine around.   
 
In a similar vein, the Executive Branch could issue a broader notice of 
discretionary enforcement as regards COVID-19.  Such a policy would 
apply the looser technology rules to contact-tracing efforts to replace the 
clunky fax.  Similarly, it might offer healthcare providers broader leeway to 
report public health risks to the public and those in danger, offering that 
good faith efforts to prevent localized outbreaks will not be punished.  
Although there already are HIPAA exceptions for public health (noted 
above), there is little concrete guidance.  Faced with a grey choice, providers 
will therefore choose to err on the side of caution and follow the letter of 
 
19 Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth Remote Communications During the 
COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.  
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/emergency-
preparedness/notification-enforcement-discretion-telehealth/index.html (last updated 
Mar. 30, 2020). 
20 Eric Hamilton, Zoom Hacking is on the Rise: Here's What You Need To Do To Be Secure, 
TECH TIMES (May 12, 2020), https://www.techtimes.com/articles/249572/20200512/zoom-
hacking-is-on-the-rise-heres-what-you-need-to-do-to-be-secure.htm. 
21 HHS Issues New Report Highlighting Dramatic Trends in Medicare Beneficiary 








HIPAA scrupulously.  While lawfulness is noble, this course protects one 
person’s information while that information could help others.   
 
Lastly, such executive action would clearly note that HIPAA does not apply 
to schools.  Ideally, this action would also address that other federal privacy 
laws like the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)22 would 
also have enforcement deferred in cases of good faith efforts to contain the 
spread of COVID-19.  This would address timidity in releasing data from 
the virus’s spread to educational settings.  An executive order may be the 
best vehicle for such a policy, as there is inter-departmental crossover 
between HHS and the Department of Education (which handles FERPA 
matters) and Justice (responsible for criminal enforcement). 
 
Longer Term Reform 
 
Longer term, policymakers might look at revisiting HIPAA to reflect those 
changes in enforcement in statute.  Public health emergencies could allow 
for more explicit waivers of HIPAA and FERPA to the extent reasonably 
aimed at fighting the spread of illness.  Digitization would be encouraged, 
instead of disincentivized, as current law does (with carve-outs for analog 
communication).  Such changes would change the current perception and 
climate of fear as regards potential HIPAA violations, facilitating the flow 
of public health data.  Good faith would be the presumed basis of 
adjudicating alleged HIPAA violations, with penalties reserved for the 
worse offenders.   
  
A statutory solution would differ from discretionary non-enforcement, as 
is currently happening with looser HIPAA enforcement as regards 
telehealth.  Discretionary non-enforcement is transient and could change 
through executive action.  Statutory change, on the other hand, would be 
the default rule and give actors (doctors, school leaders, IT specialists) more 
certainty that they will not run afoul of some law, rule, or regulation and 





22 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2018); 34 C.F.R. pt. 99. 
 
 






Medical privacy is undoubtedly an important interest.  But it does not exist 
in a vacuum.  The world is currently facing its greatest public health 
challenge in over a century.  Efforts to contain the coronavirus, pending a 
vaccine or cure, can benefit from the free flow of data to policymakers and 
the public.  Individual citizens can make better decisions with more 
information.  Public health agencies can do better contact tracing when they 
are free to use digital technology.  However, some data-holders are 
squeamish to release it for fear of violating HIPAA and incurring penalties.  
This misunderstanding of HIPAA is compounded when officials invoke the 
law to avoid, deter, or criticize disclosures that could help the public make 
decisions about school and work.  Moreover, this fear of the HIPAA 
boogeyman has sustained technological obsolescence, as seen in the 
widespread reliance on the fax machine in American healthcare.  We have 
the data and the technology to face the novel coronavirus head-on.  The 
President and Congress can and should take action to make sure that 
HIPAA-phobia does not hold us back from using them.   
 
 
Edited by Ben Davisson 
 
 
